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Abstract
The requirement for increased investment in electri-
cal energy infrastructure in the Southern African
Power Pool  (SAPP) region is contextualised.
Background on the SAPP is provided for reference.
A brief assessment of historical capacity adequacy in
the SAPP region shows historically sustained levels
of inadequacy as well as distinctive investment
cycles primarily as a result of administratively deter-
mined generation capacity investments within each
member country. The introduction of an appropri-
ately designed capacity mechanism is proposed for
SAPP to facilitate system adequacy and incentivise
long-term capacity investment.
Keywords: Interconnection; capacity investment;
electricity access; competitive electricity trade,
capacity mechanisms.
Highlights
• Increased investment in electrical energy infras-
tructure in the SAPP region is needed to enable
increased electricity access and economic
growth.
• The SAPP region has exhibited historical sus-
tained system inadequacy and distinctive invest-
ment cycles.
• Competitive electricity trade is increasing and
displacing bilateral contacts.
• An appropriately designed capacity mechanism
for SAPP could facilitate system adequacy and
incentivise long-term capacity investment.
37
* Corresponding author: Tel. (+27) 12 842 7269;
email: jwright@csir.co.za
Journal of Energy in Southern Africa 29(4): 37–50
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2413-3051/2018/v29i4a5581
Published by the Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town    ISSN: 2413-3051
http://journals.assaf.org.za/jesa
Sponsored by the  Department of Science and Technology
Volume 29   Number 4
System adequacy in the Southern African Power Pool: A
case for capacity mechanisms
Jarrad G. Wright*1,2, John van Coller2
1. School of Electrical and Information Engineering, University of the Witwatersrand, Private Bag 3, Wits 2050,
Johannesburg, South Africa
2. Energy Centre, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, PO Box 395, Pretoria 0001, South Africa
1. Introduction
This study aims to provide a collated summary of
the existing Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)
market architecture and its markets, as literature in
this regard is sparse and fragmented. Thus, an easy-
to-reference collation of SAPP market arrange-
ments and statistics becomes useful. This aims to
contribute to better understanding system adequacy
in the SAPP to support the need for a proposed
market mechanism that could incentivise capacity
investment in the region. This has not yet been pre-
sented in the literature for the SAPP and provides
for an understanding of the chronic historical ade-
quacy issues faced by the region, and proposes a
solution in the form of a market mechanism.
The Southern African Development
Community (SADC) was established in 1992, cov-
ering an area of almost 10 million km2 [1] – over
twice the land area of the European Union and
equal to that of the United States of America and
the People’s Republic of China [1]. The population
of the SADC region grew from approximately
180 million in 1995 to 300 million in 2015 [2]. This
equates to an equivalent annual average popula-
tion growth rate of 2.6% per year for 20 years.
During this same period, world population grew at
only half this rate (1.3% per year) [2]. Except for
the larger Sub-Saharan African region (2.7% per
year), no other region has shown such high levels of
population growth, the closest being the Middle-
East and North Africa (1.8% per year) and South
Asia (1.6% per year) [2]. 
Demand for electricity in the SADC region grew
from approximately 200 TWh in 1996  [3] to
295 TWh in 2016 [4], an average annual growth
rate of 2.0% per year. The interconnected maxi-
mum demand within the mainland SADC region
was 43.2 GW in 2016 (46.4 GW including countries
not yet interconnected) [4]. The SADC region per
capita electricity consumption ranged from 50–
1000 kWh/capita in 1996 to 100–1750 kWh/capita
in 2015 (excluding South Africa) [5], while annual
per capita electricity consumption in Organisation
for Economic Development and Cooperation coun-
tries ranged from approximately 7400–
8000 kWh/capita between 1996 and 2015. In addi-
tion, the electricity access rate in the region has 
remained unchanged since 2000, when electricity
access was at 13.9% moving to 13.4% in 2015 [6].
With clearly defined goals of electrification, high
levels of economic growth and expected population
growth in the SADC region in future, there is an
expectation for considerably increased electrical
energy demand. The exceptional historical and
expected future increase in electrical energy
demand has placed, and will continue to place,
pressure on SADC nations for infrastructure devel-
opment, specifically on electrical energy infrastruc-
ture, with expansion of networks and supply capac-
ity to enable increased electricity access and meet
industrial, manufacturing and agricultural demand.
Within the SADC community, it was realised
early on that there would be clear benefits in region-
al co-operation and co-ordination (notably for elec-
trical energy infrastructure) to enable economic
growth and development  [7,8]. The Southern
African Power Pool  (SAPP) was established in
1995, the oldest power pool in Africa. It aims to
‘provide the least cost, environmentally friendly and
affordable energy and increase accessibility to rural
communities.’ [9]. While the region had already
been trading electricity since the 1950s (albeit only
on a bilateral basis and at very low volumes),
increased electricity trading between SAPP mem-
bers was promoted and better co-ordinated, while
pursuing increased electricity access (especially in
rural areas) and attempting to ensure the region
attracted electrical infrastructure investment [10–
13]. As will be shown, the SAPP has matured over
time, with more members, higher trading volumes,
and additional sub-markets for electricity trade [14].
A summary of the existing SAPP market archi-
tecture and markets is presented in Section 2.
Section 3 assesses historical SAPP system adequacy
based on available data. The historical performance
of legacy and existing SAPP markets is reviewed in
Section 4. Section 5 presents a proposed market
mechanism to incentivise capacity investment in the
SAPP considering historical lack of system adequa-
cy in the region. Section 6 provides some conclu-
sions derived from the findings with regard to histor-
ical system adequacy and competitive electricity
market performance, while looking into the future
and answering how system adequacy could be
delivered in the SAPP region.
2. The Southern African Power Pool 
2.1 Establishment
The member countries of the SAPP are shown in
Figure 1. Historically, the mainland SADC region
has not been highly electrically interconnected (as
will be further described in Section 2.3). Thus, min-
imal electricity trade took place, with bilateral con-
tracts between national power utilities, typically on
a medium- to long-term basis to exchange electrici-
ty with predefined delivery requirements, volumes
and prices. The first such contract was in the 1950s
between Zaire (now known as the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia. This was
followed by the interconnection of Zimbabwe and
Zambia at Lake Kariba in the 1960s [11]. The
Songo-Apollo high voltage direct current link
between Mozambique and South Africa followed in
1975. These developments resulted in two separate
interconnected power systems (northern and south-
ern).
Following the emergence of relative political sta-
bility, it became clear that integrated and co-opera-
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tive trading of electricity from the rich hydro
resources in the northern system (Congo and
Zambezi rivers) and the rich thermal resources in
the southern region (coalfields of Botswana and
South Africa and onshore gas fields in
Mozambique) would be beneficial for all coun-
tries [15]. As a result, in 1995, the northern and
southern systems were electrically interconnected
with the construction of the 400 kV line between
Matimba (South Africa) and Insukamini
(Zimbabwe) [16]. This created a platform for elec-
tricity trading between the two previously discon-
nected power systems. This trading, however,
remained in the form of bilateral contracts updated
and renegotiated on a periodic basis. With only this
interconnector between the two systems, there was
a distinct requirement for better electrical intercon-
nection between southern African nations as well as
an enabling platform that would further promote
the trading of electricity. The platform that was
established was the SAPP. Some history, and the
general governance framework under which it was
established and currently operates, are outlined
below.
2.2 Brief history 
The Lusaka Declaration of 1980 (signed in Lusaka,
Zambia) [7] initiated regional co-operation and
development between southern African states. An
update to this (signed in Windhoek, Namibia in
1992) [8] created what is now known as the SADC,
which now has 15-member states, as listed in Table
1.
The SAPP was established in 1995 and is cur-
rently governed via a framework encapsulated in
the following:
• inter-governmental Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU);
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Figure 1: The Southern African region showing interconnection between Southern African Power
Pool (SAPP) operating members in dark green (electrically interconnected) and future
interconnection SAPP non-operating members in light green (not electrically interconnected).
Relative power system sizes for each country are also shown scaled by circle sizes (via annual
domestic energy demand – 2016 based on [1]) with the dominant South African system easily
noticeable.
• inter-utility MoU;
• agreement between operating members;
• SAPP operating guidelines; and
• SAPP market guidelines.
Table 1: Current members of the Southern
African Development Community [17].
Angola Botswana 







The inter-governmental MoU that established the
SAPP in 1995 at the SADC summit in South Africa
included the majority of the national utilities of each
country in the SADC [18]. The 2006 revised inter-
governmental MoU for the SAPP extended the
scope of members to include new entities, as out-
lined in Section 2.3. Using the inter-governmental
MoU as an enabling framework, the second SAPP
document, the inter-utility MoU governing the man-
agement of the SAPP was enacted in 1995 [19].
The latest version of this was signed in 2007, defin-
ing a new structure for the management and oper-
ations of the SAPP [12]. The third SAPP document,
the agreement between operating members (OPs)
of the SAPP was originally signed in 1995 [20]. This
document outlined responsibilities of OPs (mem-
bers whose transmission systems are interconnect-
ed) with respect to standards, operations and pric-
ing in the SAPP. A revised version of was signed in
2008 [21] and has been under review since 2012;
it is unclear whether a revised version is enacted as
yet [22]. 
The fourth and fifth SAPP documents within this
governance framework are respectively the SAPP
operating and market guidelines. The former were
first developed in 1996 [23] and defined the shar-
ing of costs and responsibilities in the SAPP (includ-
ing, inter alia, standards and guidelines for plant
operations, maintenance and safety). This docu-
ment was updated in 2014 [22]. Simultaneously,
the newly established SAPP market guidelines were
also developed and approved.
Another component critical to the ongoing oper-
ations of the SAPP was the establishment of the
SAPP co-ordination centre in 2002 in Harare,
Zimbabwe [18]. This implements, inter alia, the
SAPP objectives (a regional wholesale market for
electricity in the SADC), monitors SAPP transac-
tions between members, carries out technical stud-
ies to assess the impact of future projects on the
SAPP, coordinates training of members, and pro-
vides SAPP statistics for planning and development
in the region [18].
The governance structure of SAPP is depicted in
Figure 2 and outlined below [9,12]:
• The Directorate of Infrastructure and Services is
made up of ministers and officials from the
respective SADC countries and forms the direct
link between the SADC and the SAPP. Major
policy issues are referred from the Executive
Committee to this Directorate.
• The Executive Committee is made up of Chief
Executive Officers of the SAPP members and a
representative from the SADC Secretariat.
• The Management Committee decides on rec-
ommendations of sub-committees and the
SAPP Coordination Centre Board.
• The Operating Sub-Committee establishes and
updates methods and standards to measure
technical performance and operating proce-
dures.
• The Planning Sub-Committee establishes and
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Figure 2: Southern African Power Pool management and governance structure (2016).
updates common planning and reliability stan-
dards, reviews integrated generation and trans-
mission plans, evaluates software and other
planning tools, determines transfer capability
between systems amongst other aspects of
power system operation.
• The Environmental Sub-Committee develops
environmental guidelines for the SAPP,
amongst other issues the environmental impact
of power systems.
• The Markets Sub-Committee is responsible for
the design and continued development of the
SAPP electricity market and determines criteria
to authorise this trade.
• The SAPP Coordination Centre reports to a
Co-ordination Centre Board consisting of a
maximum of two representatives of each
national power utility.
2.3 Market participants
The classes of SAPP membership are as fol-
lows [18]:
• independent transmission company;
• independent power producer;
• power utility;
• service provider; and
• observer.
As detailed in Table 2, as at 2016 there are 12 mem-
ber states, and 16 members of the SAPP [24]: nine
operating members (national power utilities), three
non-operating members (national power utilities),
two independent transmission companies and two
independent power producers.
2.4 Size and interconnections
To provide some perspective on the electrical size of
the SAPP, a summary of the SAPP demand and
energy statistics for 2016 is given in Table 3. The
graphical overview in Figure 3 complements Table
3 and shows peak demands, domestic energy
demand, existing interconnectors (voltage levels
and transfer capacities) as well as future (planned)
interconnectors of each SAPP member coun-
try [24,25]. There is a relatively low level of inter-
connection between SAPP member countries and,
although Angola, Malawi and Tanzania are current-
ly non-operating members, there are plans to inter-
connect these countries. South Africa is by far the
largest market in the SAPP with domestic demand
making up about 90% of the total SAPP electrical
energy demand and 85% of the interconnected
SAPP demand in 2016. The three next biggest mar-
kets are the DRC and Zambia (each with 3.0% of
total and 3.3% of interconnected demand) and
Zimbabwe (2.2% of total and 2.4% of interconnect-
ed demand). Thus, South Africa is ≈30 times larger
than the next-biggest market participant.
2.5 The changing SAPP market architecture
Following the establishment of the SAPP in 1995, a
considerable amount of time passed before any for-
mal sub-markets were formed within the SAPP mar-
ket architecture (other than already existing and
periodically updated bilateral contracts). Market
participation by SAPP market participants is volun-
tary (a net-pool), meaning that the use of SAPP
markets for trading of electricity is not compulsory
as in a gross-pool. The short-term energy market
(STEM) was established in 2001 as a collaborative
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Table 2: Membership of the Southern African Power Pool (2016).
Name SAPP status Abbreviation Country
Botswana Power Corporation OP BPC Botswana
Electricidade de Mocambique OP EdM Mozambique
Electricity Supply Company of Malawi NP ESCOM Malawi
Rede Nacional de Transporte de Electricidade NP RNT Angola
Eskom OP Eskom South Africa
Hidroelectrica de Cahorra Bassa IPP HCB Mozambique
Lesotho Electricity Corporation OP LEC LEC
Mozambique Transmission Company ITC MOTRACO Mozambique
Namibia Power Company OP Nampower Namibia
Société Nationale d’Electricité OP SNEL Democratic Republic of Congo
Swaziland Electricity Supply Company OP SEC Swaziland
Tanzania Electricity Supply Company NP TANESCO Tanzania
Zambia Electricity Supply Company OP ZESCO Zambia
Copperbelt Energy Corporation ITC CEC Zambia
Lunsemfwa Hydro Power Station IPP LHPS Zambia
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority OP ZESA Zimbabwe
OP = Operating member; NP = Non-operating member; ITC = Independent transmission company; 
IPP = Independent power producer
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Table 3: Southern African Power Pool energy statistics (2016) [4,24].
Country Utility Installed Net Maximum Generation Imports System Exports Domestic 
capacity capacity demand sent-out demand demand
(MW) (MW) (MW) (GWh) (GWh) (GWh) (GWh) (GWh)
Angola ENE 3 129 2 500 1 869 12 058 0 12 058 0 12 058
Botswana BPC 927 459 610 2 057 1 679 3 736 0 3 736
DRC SNEL 2 457 1 076 1 376 8 156 95 8 250 0 8 250
Lesotho LEC 74 70 150 486 175 661 3 658
Malawi ESCOM 352 351 326 1 809 0 1 809 0 1 809
Mozambique EdM 2 724 2 279 1 850 4 956 1 004 5 960 184 5 776
Namibia Nampower 493 354 667 1 420 3 085 4 505 99 4 406
South Africa Eskom 48 467 46 202 34 481 228 896 9 703 238 599 13 465 225 134
Swaziland SEB 70 70 220 123 1 077 1 200 0 1 200
Tanzania Tanesco 1 366 823 1 051 6 403 0 6 403 0 6 403
Zambia Zesco 2 734 2 734 2 194 13 004 1 135 14 139 1 080 13 059
Zimbabwe ZESA 2 045 1 555 1 615 7 388 2 877 10 265 943 9 322
Total SAPP 64 838 58 473 46 409 286 757 20 830 307 586 15 774 291 812
Total SAPP (OP only) 59 991 54 799 43 163 266 486 20 830 287 316 15 774 271 542
Figure 3: Graphical overview of existing and future Southern African Power Pool interconnections,
along with maximum demand per country (2016) showing how operating members are
interconnected, and the future interconnection of non-operating members
(PMD – Maximum demand).
market structure within the SAPP to allow for the
trading of electricity on a shorter timeframe
between SAPP members and for trading in addition
to bilateral contracts [11,26]. From 2004 onwards,
the SAPP wished to move from the collaborative
STEM towards a market where buyers and sellers
would compete in the trading of electricity. This was
predominantly driven by principles in Nordic power
markets and resulted in the establishment of the
SAPP Day-Ahead Market (DAM) to replace the
STEM in late 2009. The SAPP DAM is a firm ener-
gy market that trades (via a double-sided auction
process) hourly energy contracts for the following
day inclusive of existing bilateral contracts (cleared
first), transmission capacity constraints and wheel-
ing fees [11,27]. A post-DAM (PDAM) was estab-
lished in 2013 to settle any outstanding imbalances
that were still present following DAM trading. The
PDAM was then discontinued when the intra-day
market (IDM) went live in December 2015.
The SAPP market architecture was further
updated recently when a number of new sub-mar-
kets were established. The sub-markets included in
this new SAPP market architecture are enabled for
market participants by the SAPP market trading
platform [28]. An overview of each of the sub-mar-
kets in the SAPP market architecture is provided
below (the sub-markets below are cleared in this
order):
• Bilateral contracts (legacy): To meet long-
term energy supply-demand balance between
market participants (can be firm and non-firm).
This sub-market predates the establishment of
the SAPP and has been the legacy sub-market
within which most electricity trading in the
SAPP has occurred. The magnitude of planned
volumes and time of delivery are confirmed the
day-ahead.
• Forward physical market (monthly) (FPM-
M), (April 2016): A sub-market where market
participants can trade either an off-peak prod-
uct for a single month (same volume and price
in off-peak hours for the month) or a non-off-
peak product for a single month (same volume
and price in non-off-peak hours of the month).
This is a sub-market that acts as a bridge
between bilateral contracts and the FPM-W 
(outlined next). The magnitude of planned vol-
umes and time of delivery are confirmed the
day-ahead following bilateral contracts.
• Forward physical market (weekly) (FPM-
W), (April 2016): A sub-market where market
participants can trade off-peak, standard and
Ppeak products for a week (with the same vol-
ume and price for all off-peak, standard and
peak hours of the week respectively). This is a
sub-market that acts as a bridge between the
FPM-M and the DAM.
• Day-ahead market (DAM) (January 2010):
An open and competitive sub-market traded on
a day-ahead basis with gate-closure at 12h00
for next delivery day to meet short-term supply-
demand balances between SAPP market partic-
ipants. The market clearing price of the DAM is
the main reference price for the competitive
electricity market in the SAPP. 
• Intra-day market (IDM) (December 2015): A
sub-market where market participants can con-
tinuously trade up to one hour prior to delivery.
This essentially replaces the previous post-
DAM. The IDM matches market participants
automatically on a first-come first-served basis
if a seller’s offer price is less than a buyer’s bid
price and a seller’s volume is lower than (or
equal to) a buyer’s volume.
• Interchange imbalance energy: Imbalance
energy is settled based on the differences
between schedules and actuals in a specific
hour of operation. This is currently settled in the
SAPP by averaging the system frequency over
the dispatch period (one hour) and requiring a
rate to be paid as a function of the frequency
deviation from nominal (50 Hz). This is current-
ly linked to the average and highest generation
cost in the SAPP, but there are proposals to link
this deviation to the DAM MCP.
3. The SAPP system adequacy
3.1 Power system reliability
As is well known, and described by Kundur [29]
and Billinton [30], power system reliability is usually
conceptualised as being made up of two compo-
nents: (1) adequacy: The existence of sufficient
facilities in the power system to satisfy demand; and
(2) ecurity (resiliency): The ability of the power sys-
tem to respond to and recover from unexpected dis-
turbances within the power system or from external
disturbances. These two concepts are interdepen-
dent and only separated for convenience.
Adequacy typically relates to a steady state of the
power system and whether it has sufficient capabil-
ity to match supply and demand, whilst security
(resiliency) is the dynamic process of transitioning
from one state to another. The focus of this section
is on the historical adequacy of the SAPP and does
not address system security. In addition, adequacy
is assessed from the perspective of hierarchical level
(HL) I only (the collective ability of supply capacity
to meet demand) and excludes HL II (supply and
transmission networks) and HL  III (generation,
transmission and distribution networks) [30].
3.2 Historical review of system adequacy
A brief assessment of the historical capacity ade-
quacy in the SAPP is conducted in this section, pre-
dominantly based on the available data
in [9,21,37–39,22,24,31–36]. The proxy used for
the assessment of system adequacy is the annual
43 Journal of Energy in Southern Africa  •  Vol 29 No 4 • November 2018
operating supply capacity relative to annual maxi-
mum demand, with a benchmark of 20% reserve
margin used as a typical demonstrative metric for
system adequacy. Figure 4(a) summarises the ade-
quacy of the overall SAPP region while Figure 4(b)
summarises the adequacy of the interconnected
SAPP. Due to the significant size of the South
African power system, Figure 5(a) considers the
overall SAPP adequacy without South Africa, while
Figure 5(b) considers the interconnected SAPP also
without South Africa. The SAPP maximum
demand has been growing at an average rate of
1.6% per year (including South Africa), but at a
much higher rate of 5.2% when removing South
Africa. The interconnected SAPP has seen average
peak demand growth of 1.2% per year (including
South Africa) and, similarly, much higher at 3.9%
per year when excluding South Africa. If focus is
given on the interconnected SAPP in Figure 4(b) ,
there are almost no years within which an adequate
regional power system has been realised (using the
adequacy criteria benchmark of reserve margin
>20%). When considering the interconnected
SAPP without South Africa in Figure 5(b), not only
has there been perpetual inadequacy but there
have been extended periods (2004-2011) with
insufficient supply capacity relative to maximum
demand.
Another significant outcome from the data pre-
sented is a distinct investment cycle over the period
considered, as can be seen in Figures 4 and 5 (par-
ticularly noticeable in Figure 5). Although more
data would help to further assess whether this has
been an ongoing phenomenon in the SAPP region
(even prior to interconnection and the SAPP), the
clear investment cycle is noticeable with the avail-
able data.
4. Performance of SAPP electricity markets
4.1 Bilateral contracts
Although a full set of data is not available for SAPP
bilateral trades, volumes traded in SAPP bilateral
contracts are shown in Figure 6 based on available
data. Although these do vary year-on-year depend-
ing on specific regional conditions, a maximum of
approximately 19 000 GWh was traded bilaterally
in 2005 (about 8.1% of the interconnected SAPP
demand). From this, bilateral contract volumes
seem to have been decreasing, more recently, down
to about 6 100 GWh in 2015 (2.9% of the intercon-
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Historical adequacy of (a) all of Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) excluding South
Africa; and (b) interconnected SAPP excluding South Africa for the period 2004–2016, showing an
exaggerated consistent lack of system adequacy combined with over/under supply cycles.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Historical system adequacy of (a) all of Southern African Power Pool (SAPP); and (b)
interconnected SAPP for the period 2004–2016, showing marginal levels of system adequacy
combined with over/under supply cycles.
nected SAPP annual energy demand). This is
important, considering the context of competitive
electricity markets introduced into the SAPP. It is
also important to note that, as a result of SAPP mar-
ket participants being predominantly vertically inte-
grated utilities and network congestion in the SAPP,
bilateral trading has historically resulted in a rela-
tively small role for both co-operative and competi-
tive electricity trade. This is evident in the data pre-
sented, where the relative electricity trade volumes
for competitive electricity markets in the SAPP are
shown in Figure 6. This has also been considered
by other authors more recently [40].
4.2 Performance of SAPP competitive
markets
The SAPP historical electricity trade (annual)
excluding bilateral trading is shown in Figure 7, dif-
ferentiating between co-operative and competitive
electricity trade (transition from STEM to DAM).
This is based on similar data used for extracting
bilateral contract trade volumes supplemented by
data in historical SAPP Monthly Market
Performance Reports [14]. Bilateral contracts had
been supplemented by the collaborative SAPP
STEM between 2001 and 2007. The SAPP STEM
traded with volumes of between 70-740 GWh
annually when in operation. 
Since the STEM was replaced by the competi-
tive SAPP DAM, which effectively went live at the
beginning of 2010, increasing year-on-year trade
volumes have been realised in almost all years, as
can be seen in Figure 7. The DAM is the main com-
petitive electricity market in the SAPP. The DAM
was supplemented by the IDM in December 2015,
followed by the FPM-W and FPM-M, both of which
went live in April 2016. Significant increases in
trade volumes on the DAM have been realised since
2015 where trade shifted from 71 GWh in 2014 to
451 GWh in 2015 and 924 GWh in 2016. Although
absolute competitive electricity trade volumes
increased in 2017, a slight decrease in DAM trade
volumes occurred in 2017 mostly as a result of
increased competitive trade volumes in other mar-
kets established (IDM, FPM-W and FPM-M). The
increase in competitive electricity trade is also
demonstrated in Figure 8, where in the first half of
the 2017/18 year alone there has already been
almost as much competitive electricity trade as
there was in the full 2016/17 year.
The increased interest by SAPP market partici-
pants’ competitive electricity markets and the intro-
duction of additional competitive electricity markets
(as previously described) has driven the increase in
competitive electricity trade volumes. For further
insight into this in more recent times, the monthly
trade volumes (along with average MCP) for the
DAM, IDM, FPM-W and FPM-M are shown in
Figure 8, where the upward trend in trade volumes
is even more clearly indicated. The MCP on the
DAM (and other markets) trended downwards in
2017 (likely because of the considerable increase in
trade volumes). Despite this downward trend very
recently, the SAPP DAM has become a market with-
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Figure 6: Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) historical annual bilateral electricity trade 
(estimated where data not available). Bilateral electricity trade has historically dominated SAPP
electricity trade volumes but is declining (competitive trade in 2017 and 2018 financial year shown
for scale). FPM-W – Forward physical market (weekly), FPM-M – Forward physical market (monthly),
DAM – Day-ahead market, PDAM – Post day-ahead market, IDM – Intra-day market  
[9,21,37–39,22,24,31–36].
in which a stabilised reference price for electricity
(the DAM MCP) has been established over more
than five years and has started to prove itself as a
market where increased trading and investment
could be incentivised for existing and future market
participants. 
It is appreciated that although these increases in
competitive electricity trade volumes mean there is
a larger role being played by these markets in the
SAPP, they are still relatively small in volume com-
pared with SAPP bilateral trades and the overall
SAPP interconnected electrical energy demand.
Bilateral contracts still dominate trading (but to a
lesser extent in recent years) while most domestic
electrical energy demand is met by domestic supply
in the SAPP countries. A concerted effort is neces-
sary to ensure that these competitive markets play a
larger role in electricity trade in the region using the
established reference prices for electricity in future
as this assists in providing transparent price signals
to potential investors.
5. A market mechanism to incentivise
capacity investment in the SAPP
5.1 Addressing chronic lack of system
adequacy in the SAPP
At a system operations level, most countries within
the SAPP (and associated SAPP market partici-
pants) aim to implement and ensure a pre-defined
level of operating reserves. Trading on the SAPP is
undertaken by market participants at this level util-
ising the previously described markets available as
part of the SAPP market architecture. At a planning
level, however, fragmented approaches to ensuring
system adequacy (if any) are adopted and there is
no consistent approach to this. In addition, admin-
istrative and bureaucratic processes often hamper
and delay timely electrical infrastructure invest-
ments. More specifically, investments in supply
capacity to ensure sustained system adequacy both
within each country and regionally are not made
timeously.
Although not in the public domain, some region-
al-level master-planning has been undertaken peri-
odically in the past for the SAPP but has not result-
ed in a harmonised manner in which sustained sys-
tem adequacy could be ensured in the future.
Notwithstanding the existing regulatory frameworks
within particular countries, there is a distinct need to
ensure that sufficient capacity is available when
needed to ensure a pre-defined level of system ade-
quacy in future. Investment cycles and persistent
lack of system adequacy (as demonstrated) are not
sustainable in the long-term and need to be suffi-
ciently addressed.
At the other end of the electricity market design
spectrum, in a completely deregulated market envi-
ronment with energy traded as the only primary
product (wholesale energy-only markets), scarcity
pricing is meant to provide the necessary incentives
for new market entry and also keeps existing capac-
ity operational to provide capacity when need-
ed [41–47]. Practically, this is often not the case for
various reasons including demand-side inelasticity,
demand uncertainty, non-zero lead times for capac-
ity investments, market power and investor risk
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Figure 7: Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) historical electricity trade (annual). The increase in
competitive electricity market trade in SAPP is clearly demonstrated by 2017/18 year already
exhibiting twice as much trade as there was in 2016/17. FPM-W – Forward physical market (weekly),
FPM-M – Forward physical market (monthly), DAM – Day-ahead market, PDAM – Post day-ahead
market, IDM – Intra-day market, STEM – Short-term energy market.
aversion as noted in [44,45,47,48]. It is debatable
whether the inherent scarcity pricing that results
under tight supply-demand conditions will incen-
tivise new marginal generation capacity and/or
keep existing capacity operational if only needed
for a low number of hours in the year. This has driv-
en active research into capacity mechanisms (CMs)
and/or mechanisms regulatory frameworks that
should bring sufficient capacity to market (via a
capacity product).
5.2 Capacity mechanisms for the SAPP
The previously provided context is particularly per-
tinent in a regional market environment like the
SAPP where individual countries have their own
regulatory framework within which they operate,
whilst also having the opportunity to trade electrici-
ty regionally. Based on the assessment in Section 3,
it was shown that system adequacy has not been
consistently maintained in the SAPP and, in
Section 4, it was shown that the share of total ener-
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(a)
(b)
Figure 8: Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) historical monthly competitive electricity market
trade showing (a) dominance of the Day-ahead market (DAM) (as expected) as well as growing
competitive electricity trade in the region; and (b) Historical market clearing prices for SAPP
competitive electricity markets showing stabilised reference prices for electricity in the region.
gy traded versus total energy demand in the SAPP
has been historically quite low (but is nevertheless
growing). Thus, the introduction of an appropriate-
ly designed CM in the SAPP is proposed to facilitate
system adequacy and incentivise capacity invest-
ment in the region in future. Leveraging on the his-
torical experience gained on the SAPP market trad-
ing platforms, whilst embracing regional integration,
could allow for a more transparent, effective (ability
to avoid shortages) and efficient (low-cost)
approach that ensures system adequacy across the
region by various market participants in future.
Globally, CMs have been in operation in several
jurisdictions for several years, with more being con-
sidered in the near future. Some better-known
implementations are shown graphically in Figure 9
(including those under consideration for implemen-
tation by 2020) [49–54]. The range of pertinent CM
types are mentioned in Figure 9 but for brevity are
not described here and will instead be provided in
future publications.
At this stage, the most appropriate CM for the
SAPP is probably a forward-looking capacity auc-
tion type of CM with a pre-defined capacity (vol-
ume) spatially disaggregated into each country (or
SAPP node), supplied by all possible resources
(supply- and demand-side options) with all feasible
SAPP market participants participating. This would
likely be managed by appropriately mandated insti-
tutions like a regional regulatory authority and
regional transmission system operators on an annu-
al basis. An implementing institution would likely be
the SAPP co-ordination centre working in collabo-
ration with regional operators. Incentivisation of
new-entry into the market should be provided, con-
sidering the expected significant growth in demand
as well as previous performance and market domi-
nance of incumbents in the SAPP region. Cross-
border participation principles for capacity provi-
sion should be prioritised to promote regional inte-
gration. 
6. Conclusions 
The introduction of an appropriately designed
capacity mechanism (CM) is proposed for the
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) region to facil-
itate system adequacy and incentivise long-term
capacity investment. Resulting sustained adequacy
should enable increased electricity access and eco-
nomic growth in the region, as has been experi-
enced globally. Administratively determined supply
capacity decisions within each country have 
historically dominated the region but have been
shown not to be capable of ensuring acceptable
adequacy levels and also result in investment
cycles. Similarly, in a competitive market environ-
ment, scarcity pricing should incentivise new market
entry and keep existing capacity operational.
However, in globally deregulated competitive 
electricity markets as well as those established as
part of the SAPP market design, this does not occur
in reality for various reasons highlighted. At this
stage, for the SAPP, a CM utilising a forward looking
capacity auction for capacity spatially disaggregat-
ed, including all supply- and demand-side resources
with all participating SAPP market participants, is
proposed. This could be implemented by an appro-
priately mandated institution (likely a regional regu-
latory authority) with the involvement of key imple-
menting institutions like the SAPP co-ordination
centre and regional transmission system operators.
It has been identified that literature on SAPP market 
performance and, more specifically, CMs in the
region is scarce, and this paper contributes to the lit-
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Figure 9: Global map of pertinent existing capacity mechanisms and those under consideration for
implementation by 2020.
erature on these topics. However, future research
aims to further formalise and assess CM options for
the SAPP based on relevant design criteria that bet-
ter characterises the proposed CM as well as other
CMs for the region.
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